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LAnoR LAw-LMRA-VAUDITY UNDER FEDERAL Acr OF STATE R.:rGHT TO 
WORK STATUTE INTERPRETED TO BAR EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS CLAUSE-
Plaintiff employer, operator of a retail food store, refused to sign a contract 
with a union representing the only two butchers then employed by him on 
the ground that acceptance of a clause in the contract making the union 
the exclusive bargaining representative of all butchers in his establishment 
would violate the state right to work statute.1 The two butchers went on 
strike and began picketing the employer's establishment. The employer 
thereupon hired a non-union butcher and sought to have the picketing 
enjoined.2 The state district court denied the injunction. On certiorari to 
the state supreme court, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. A non-union 
butcher's right to work would be abridged if the union acted as his agent 
without his consent. Therefore, the contract provision at issue, if embodied 
in the collective agreement, would violate the state right to work statute 
which provides that "it is hereby declared to be ..• public policy ... that 
the right •.. to work shall not be •.. abridged on account of membership 
or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization."3 Piegts v. 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers' Workmen, Local No. 437-AFL, 
(La. 1955) 81 S. (2d) 835. 
The state supreme court's interpretation is open to serious question. It 
l La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 23, §23:881 to 23:888. 
2 Even though peaceful, picketing for an unlawful purpose, e.g., to compel an em-
ployer to negotiate a contract that would violate a valid state statute, may be enjoined. 
Local 10, United Assn. of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters v. Graham, 345 U.S. 
192, 73 S.Ct. 585 (1953). 
3 La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 23, §23:881. 
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rests upon the proposition that the right to work includes the component 
right to bargain individually over working conditions, and that, therefore, 
the statute protects this component right unless a workman voluntarily re-
linquishes it. While this broad definition is interesting as a piece of legal 
conceptualism, it is more than likely that the legislature intended the word 
"work" to have the everyday meaning given it by the layman. Particularly 
is this true in view of section IO of the same statute which provides that 
"nothing in this Part shall be construed to deny or abridge the right of 
employees by and through a labor organization ... to bargain collectively 
with their employer."4 Furthermore, the Louisiana statute is not signifi-
cantly different from those of other states5 and, in light of the history of 
these laws, 6 the suggestion that they were aimed at agreements other than 
those requiring union membership as a condition of employment is a novel 
one. But however questionable the court's interpretation of the state stat-
ute may be, it must be accepted by a federal court.7 Even though the 
employment relationship involved in the principal case was held not to be 
covered8 by the amended National Labor Relations Act,9 the state statute 
does not distinguish relationships which are subject to federal jurisdiction. 
Hence the principal case raises at least the theoretical question of whether 
a state has the power under the amended NLRA to preserve the riglit of 
individual bargaining by non-union members by outlawing contract pro-
visions granting exclusive bargaining rights.1° Clearly such a power is not 
conferred by section 14 (b) of the federal act which allows states to prohibit 
the "execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a 
labor organization as a condition of employment .... "11 While there may 
4 Id., §23:887. 
5 For example, the Virginia statute provides that "it is hereby declared to be the 
public policy of Virginia that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged 
on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization." 
Va. Code (1950) tit. 40, §40-68. A statute more likely to warrant the interpretation given 
the statute in the principal case is that of Texas which provides that "the inherent right 
of a person to work and bargain freely with his employer, individually or collectively, for 
terms and conditions of his employment shall not be denied or infringed by law, or by 
any organization of whatever nature." 15 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1947) art. 5207 (a), §1. 
6 See 21 BROOK. L. REv. 245 (1955). 
7 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). No appeal to the Supreme 
Court has been taken in the principal case as the union withdrew its demand for the 
clause in issue following the state supreme court's decision, thus ending the particular 
controversy. Principal case at 841. 
s The court stated that all plaintiff's operations are "strictly intrastate." Principal 
case at 836. However, the test of federal coverage is whether the particular employment 
relationship affects interstate commerce. See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 S.Ct. 668 
(1939). 
9 Labor-Managment Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 136, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§141 to 168. 
10 Even if this question is answered in the affirmative, the constitutional requirement 
of due process must also be met. The constitutionality of a typical right to work statute 
was upheld in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 
525, 69 S.Ct. 251 (1949). For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by the principal 
case, see 8 STAN. L. REv. 105 (1955). 
llLabor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 151, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §164(b). 
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be disagreement concerning the conditions under which a state may exer-
cise jurisdiction in an area where the federal act is silent or the National 
Labor Relations Board declines to exercise potential jurisdiction, the cases 
are unanimous in holding that a state may not enforce policies in conflict 
with express policies of the federal act.12 Section 9 (a) of the latter act spe-
cifically provides that representatives selected for the purposes of collective 
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all employees in that unit.13 Certainly a state statute 
interpreted to conflict with this provision should not be sustained by the 
federal courts. 
Edward W. Powers, S.Ed. 
12 For a collection and analysis of the recent cases and literature in this difficult area 
of labor relations law, see 53 MICH. L. REv. 602 (1955); 54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 540 (1956). 
13 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 143, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159 (a). 
